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Attempt to Monopolize: Dangerous Probability of
Success as an Obstacle to Enforcing Section 2 of
the Sherman Act
Over the last seventy-five years judicial decisions and schol-
arly debate have failed to provide a uniform definition of
"attempt to monopolize" under section 2 of the Sherman Act."
The Supreme Court has not dealt substantively with the
attempt clause since 1951' and has consistently denied certiorari
in some very pressing cases.3 Thus, the federal courts of appeal
have become courts of last resort for cases involving an attempt
to monopolize, presenting significant problems for business plan-
ners who labor to conform their behavior to the laws of the vari-
ous circuits.'
1. Section 2 of the Sherman Act provides that:
Every person who shall monopolize, or attempt to monopolize, or combine or
conspire with any other person or persons, to monopolize any part of the trade
or commerce among the several States, or with foreign nations, shall be
deemed guilty of a felony, and, on conviction thereof, shall be punished by fine
not exceeding one million dollars if a corporation, or, if any other person, one
hundred thousand dollars, or by imprisonment not exceeding three years, or by
both said punishments, in the discretion of the court.
15 U.S.C. § 2 (1976).
2. Lorain Journal Co. v. United States, 342 U.S. 143 (1951).
3. E.g., United States v. Empire Gas Corp., 537 F.2d 296 (8th Cir. 1976), cert.
denied, 429 U.S. 1122 (1977). For a discussion of Empire Gas, see infra text accompany-
ing notes 55-60. John Shenefield, former Assistant United States Attorney General in
charge of the Antitrust Division and chairman of a presidential commission for the
review of antitrust laws, recently stated that if the Supreme Court did not take Empire
Gas, it probably never would take any case. Debate: Should the Sherman Act Be
Amended to Broaden the Offense of Attempt to Monopolize? 48 ANTITRusT L.J. 1433,
1437 (1979) (remarks of John Shenefield).
4. The circuit courts of appeals are not in agreement as to what constitutes an
"attempt to monopolize" violation. Compare United States v. Empire Gas Corp., 537
F.2d 296, 306-07 (8th Cir. 1976) (finding no "dangerous probability of success" because
defendant had not yet succeeded in monopolizing the market), cert. denied, 429 U.S.
1122 (1977) with Janich Bros. v. American Distilling Co., 570 F.2d 848, 853 (9th Cir.
1977) (stating that "the trier-of-fact may infer dangerous probability of success from
proof of specific intent to control prices or destroy competition. ... ), cert. denied, 439
U.S. 829 and Kearney & Trecker Corp. v. Giddings & Lewis, Inc., 452 F.2d 579, 598 (7th
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The debate over the elements forming an "attempt to
monopolize" action reflects two contrary approaches. The major-
ity of courts have held that an "attempt to monopolize" viola-
tion requires proof that the defendant was engaged in some
anticompetitive conduct, had the specific intent to monopolize
the relevant market, and had a market share5 large enough to
create a dangerous probability of successfully monopolizing that
market. A minority of courts, most notably, the Ninth Circuit
Court of Appeals, has held that independent proof of "danger-
ous probability of success" is not always necessary for an
attempt to monopolize action.7 The Ninth Circuit, however, has
not completely eliminated the "dangerous probability of suc-
cess" element from the attempt analysis.8 The courts should
take the final step toward clearing up this confused area of the
Cir. 1971) (stating that "[tihe ultimate concern is the firm's actual or threatened impact
on competition in the relevant market."), cert. denied, 405 U.S. 1066 (1972). Any busi-
ness with operations extending over circuit boundaries, therefore, may be subject to dif-
ferent attempt to monopolize law.
5. For a discussion of "dangerous probability of success" as it relates to market
share, see infra note 22 and accompanying text.
6. See, e.g., Lektro-Vend Corp. v. Vendo Co., 660 F.2d 255 (7th Cir. 1981); 0. Horn-
mel Co. v. Feno Corp., 659 F.2d 340 (3d Cir. 1981); Associated Radio Serv. Co. v. Page
Airways, Inc., 624 F.2d 1342 (5th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 1030 (1981); Nifty
Foods Corp. v. Great Atl. & Pac. Tea Co., 614 F.2d 832 (2d Cir. 1980); Perington Whole-
sale, Inc. v. Burger King Corp., 631 F.2d 1369 (10th Cir. 1979); Stifel, Nicolaus & Co. v.
Dain, Kalman & Quail, Inc., 578 F.2d 1256 (8th Cir. 1978); Kearney & Trecker Corp. v.
Cincinnati Milacron, Inc., 562 F.2d 365 (6th Cir. 1977); George R. Whitten, Jr., Inc. v.
Paddock Pool Builders, Inc., 508 F.2d 547 (1st Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 421 U.S. 1004
(1975).
7. See, e.g., A.H. Cox & Co. v. Star Mach. Co., 653 F.2d 1302 (9th Cir. 1981); Cali-
fornia Steel & Tube v. Kaiser Steel Corp., 650 F.2d 1001 (9th Cir. 1981); Pierce Packing
Co. v. John Morrell & Co., 633 F.2d 1362 (9th Cir. 1980); Hunt-Wesson Foods, Inc. v.
Ragu Foods, Inc., 627 F.2d 919 (9th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 921 (1981); Carpet
Seaming Tape Licensing Corp. v. Best Seam, Inc., 616 F.2d 1133 (9th Cir. 1980); Ernest
W. Hahn, Inc. v. Codding, 615 F.2d 830 (9th Cir. 1980).
The law in the Ninth Circuit is somewhat confused. Some panels have required a
"dangerous probability of success." See Cornwell Quality Tools Co. v. C.T.S. Co., 446
F.2d 825 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 1049 (1971), where the court stated that C.T.S.
had to prove "specific intent to monopolize and . . . sufficient market power to come
dangerously close to success." 446 F.2d at 832 (emphasis added). Generally, however, the
Ninth Circuit has not required independent proof of "dangerous probability of success."
Recently, in West v. Whitney-Fidalgo Seafoods, Inc., 628 P.2d 10 (Alaska, 1981), the
Alaska Supreme Court adopted the Ninth Circuit position in interpreting Alaska's
attempt to monopolize statute, ALAsKA STAT. § 45.50.564 (1980), which is identical to the
federal statute. The court stated that "proof of relevant market and dangerous
probability that such market will be monopolized are not indispensable elements of the
attempt offense." 628 P.2d at 15.
8. See infra notes 25-39 and accompanying text.
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law and provide a uniform interpretation of "attempt to monop-
olize" by eliminating "dangerous probability of success" as an
element of the offense.
This Comment analyzes the conflicting definitions of
attempt to monopolize. First, the Comment outlines the major-
ity position requiring proof of "dangerous probability of success"
in an "attempt to monopolize" case under section 2 of the Sher-
man Act. Next, the Comment examines the minority position
and finds that it raises countervailing concerns that warrant
eliminating the "dangerous probability of success" requirement.
Finally, this Comment concludes that the "dangerous
probability of success" element adds nothing but confusion to
the "attempt to monopolize" analysis and should therefore be
eliminated.
I. THE MAJORITY POSITION: PROOF OF DANGEROUS PROBABILITY
OF SUCCESS A REQUIREMENT
The majority position requiring proof of specific intent,
anticompetitive conduct, and dangerous probability of success
for an attempt to monopolize rests on three grounds. First, the
majority relies on several Supreme Court cases beginning with
Justice Holmes' elucidation of the attempt offense in Swift &
Co. v. United States. Second, the majority argues that the elim-
ination of dangerous probability of success would promote a
flood of nuisance cases. Finally, and most important, the major-
ity raises economic policy considerations to demonstrate the
need for the dangerous probability of success requirement.
The Supreme Court first defined attempt to monopolize in
Swift & Co. v. United States.10 The Court stated that where acts
are not sufficient in themselves to produce a prohibited result,
an intent to achieve that result is necessary to produce a danger-
ous probability that it will happen.
But when that intent and the consequent dangerous
probability exist, this statute [section 2], like many others and
like the common law in some cases, directs itself against that
dangerous probability as well as against the completed
result ....
... Not every act that may be done with intent to pro-
9. 196 U.S. 375 (1905).
10. Id.
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duce an unlawful result is unlawful, or constitutes an attempt.
It is a question of proximity and degree. The distinction
between mere preparation and attempt is well known in the
criminal law. The same distinction is recognized in cases like
the present.1 1
Courts adhering to the majority view regard this language from
Swift as establishing dangerous probability of success as a sepa-
rate and essential element in an attempt to monopolize cause of
action. While minority courts do not require dangerous
probability of success, all courts generally agree that Swift was
the first case to define the elements required for an attempt to
monopolize cause of action.12
The Supreme Court has addressed attempt to monopolize in
relatively few cases since its 1905 decision in Swift. 5 Courts
adopting the majority position typically cite three cases as
authority for requiring dangerous probability of success. In the
first case, American Tobacco Co. v. United States,1 4 the Court
quoted from a jury instruction which stated "[t]he phrase
'attempt to monopolize' means the employment of means and
procedures which would, if successful, accomplish monopoliza-
tion, and which, though falling short, nevertheless approach so
close as to create a dangerous probability of it . . ... ,5 In the
second case, Lorain Journal Co. v. United States,"' the Court
11. Id. at 396, 402 (citations omitted).
12. See, e.g., 3 P. ARREDA & D. TURNER, ANTITRusT LAW: AN ANALYSIS OF ANrrrrur
PRINCIPLES AND THEIR APPLICATION V 831, at 336 (1978); L. SULLIvAN, HANDBOOK OF THE
LAW OF ANTITRUST § 50, at 134 (1977). Courts adopting the minority view also use the
language in Swift, but as authority for eliminating the dangerous probability of success
requirement. See infra text accompanying note 46. The language in Swift is inconclusive
partly because Justice Holmes gave no indication of what dangerous probability of suc-
cess might entail.
13. Attempt to monopolize and monopolization violations, both section 2 offenses,
are usually pleaded together. Courts tend to concentrate on monopolization claims more
than on attempt claims, and thus rarely deal with the essential elements of an attempt
cause of action. See, e.g., American Tobacco v. United States, 328 U.S. 781 (1945).
14. 328 U.S. 781 (1945).
15. Id. at 785. In American Tobacco, the defendants were convicted of violating sec-
tions 1 and 2 of the Sherman Act, including the offenses of monopolization and attempt
to monopolize. On appeal, the Supreme Court stated that its grant of certiorari was "lim-
ited to the question whether actual exclusion of competitors is necessary to the crime of
monopolization under section 2 of the Sherman Act." Id. at 784. Even though the
Supreme Court quoted from the attempt to monopolize jury instruction, the Court pro-
ceeded to discuss only the monopolization claim and not the attempt claim. Doubt,
therefore, exists as to whether American Tobacco is controlling authority or merely
dictum.
16. 342 U.S. 143 (1951).
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upheld an attempt to monopolize conviction, citing the danger-
ous probability langauge of Swift.'" In Walker Process Equip-
ment, Inc. v. Food Machine & Chemical Corp.,'8 the third case,
the Court stated that monopolization and attempt to monopo-
lize causes of action require assessing the defendant's ability to
lessen or destroy competition in the relevant market. Most lower
courts adopting the majority view rely on these cases as author-
ity for requiring independent proof of dangerous probability of
success.' 9
In addition to referring to these Supreme Court cases,
courts adopting the majority view argue that maintaining the
dangerous probability of success requirement is necessary to
prevent a flood of nuisance cases. The antitrust laws authorize
treble damages for plaintiffs who successfully prove injury
resulting from an attempt to monopolize.20 The majority courts
fear that plaintiffs seeking treble damages will bring actions for
alleged violations involving only a de minimus effect on com-
merce and competition. The benefits received by preventing the
alleged illegal behavior would not offset the considerable judicial
resources devoted to litigating the claims. The majority argues
that the dangerous probability of success element, by requiring
proof of a sufficiently high market share, filters out the frivolous
cases that would otherwise unnecessarily burden the already
congested courts. This stricter standard of proof, then, reduces
17. Id. at 153. The defendant in Lorain Journal was a local newspaper that refused
to accept advertisements from local merchants who had advertised on a new radio sta-
tion, in an effort to regain its monopoly as the sole news source and advertising medium
for the area. The Court, however, limited its holding regarding attempt to monopolize to
preventing a monopolist from using his power to protect or regain his monopoly. The
Lorain Journal had a substantial monopoly between 1933 and 1948 and tried to use its
position to eliminate the new entrant to the market, the radio station. Id. at 152. The
Court held that "a single newspaper, already enjoying a substantial monopoly in its area,
violates the 'attempt to monopolize' clause of section 2 when it uses its monopoly to
destroy threatened competition." Id. at 154. When a substantial monopoly already exists,
finding a dangerous probability of success merely states the conclusion.
18. 382 U.S. 172 (1965). In Walker Process, plaintiff moved to dismiss its own pat-
ent infringement claim, and defendant Walker counterclaimed alleging that plaintiff had
fraudulently procured its patent, constituting a section 2 monopolization violation.
Because the case involved only a monopolization claim, the language concerning attempt
to monopolize is dictum, leaving some doubt as to its authoritativeness. See L. SULLIAN,
supra note 12, at 140.
19. See, e.g., Oetiker v. Jurid Werke, G.m.b.H., 556 F.2d 1 (D.C. Cir. 1977), and
cases cited supra note 6.
20. 15 U.S.C. § 15 (1976). The section provides that "any person who shall be
injured in his business or property by reason of anything forbidden in the antitrust laws
• . . shall recover threefold the damages by him sustained ....
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the amount of unnecessary complex antitrust litigation.
Finally, courts adopting the majority position assert that
eliminating the dangerous probability of success element would
chill the aggressive competitive conduct Congress intended the
Sherman Act to promote.' 1 A plaintiff in an attempt to monopo-
lize case proves a dangerous probability of success by showing
that the defendant possesses a sufficiently high share of the rele-
vant geographic and product market.2 The majority argues that
requiring such proof shelters firms with no real potential for
monopolizing the market from antitrust liability. Small firms
can thus vigorously compete with larger firms without the threat
of antitrust liability.
Related to the alleged deleterious effect on smaller firms is
the majority's concern that elimination of dangerous probability
of success would also chill aggressive pricing by the dominant
firms in a market. For example, eliminating dangerous
probability of success might encourage lower federal courts to
crack down on aggressive business conduct."3 Thus, larger firms
21. See infra text accompanying notes 30-33 for a discussion of the purposes under-
lying section 2 and the Sherman Act in general.
22. See 3 P. AREEDA & D. TURNER, supra note 12, 1 831, at 336. Most courts define
dangerous probability of success as the possession of "market power" in the relevant
geographic and product markets. See, e.g., Harold Friedman, Inc. v. Kroger Co., 581 F.2d
1068, 1079 (3d Cir. 1978); Aviation Specialties, Inc. v. United Technologies Corp., 568
F.2d 1186, 1192 (5th Cir. 1978); Kearney & Trecker Corp. v. Cincinnati Milacron, Inc.,
562 F.2d 365, 373 (6th Cir. 1977); FLM Collision Parts, Inc. v. Ford Motor Co., 543 F.2d
1019, 1030 (2d Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1097 (1977). Proof of defendant's share
of the relevant geographic and product market proves market power. E.g., George R.
Whitten, Jr., Inc. v. Paddock Pool Builders, Inc., 508 F.2d 547, 554 (1st Cir. 1974), cert.
denied, 421 U.S. 1004 (1975); Mullis v. Arco Petroleum Corp., 502 F.2d 290, 297 (7th Cir.
1974); Greenville Publishing Co. v. Daily Reflector, Inc., 496 F.2d 391, 399 (4th Cir.
1974). Other elements may also be involved in demonstrating market power, including
product differentiation, exclusive patents or superior access to vital resources. E.g., Con-
tinental T.V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania, Inc., 433 U.S. 36, 64 (1977) (White, J., concurring).
For the most part, though, plaintiffs typically prove market power and dangerous
probability of success by analyzing defendant's share of the relevant geographic and
product market.
Some courts argue against equating dangerous probability of success with market
share. E.g., William Inglis & Sons Baking Co. v. ITT Continental Baking Co., 652 F.2d
917, 933 (1981). For all practical purposes, however, they are equal. The most compelling
reason for equating the two is the conceptual difficulty of finding a firm with a low mar-
ket share dangerously close to monopolizing the market. Courts rarely find a defendant
dangerofxsly close to obtaining monopoly power when it has less than a 50% share of the
market. This Comment uses dangerous probability of success and market share analysis
synonomously with the qualification that in occasional cases elements other than market
share may also prove dangerous probability of success.
23. During a panel discussion of suggested changes in the law, one commentator
observed: "Judges will know one thing: They are supposed to crack down hard." 48 ANTI-
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will shy away from aggressive pricing to avoid risking antitrust
liability. Dominant producers will hold back production," raise
prices, and create a "price umbrella" under which smaller firms
may produce inefficiently yet still exist. This results in a non-
competitive market, and higher consumer prices.
To summarize, the majority first argues that Supreme Court
cases beginning with Swift support the requirement of danger-
ous probability of. success as an essential element of a prima
facie attempt to monopolize case. Second, the majority fears
that elimination of this element will increase de minimus nui-
sance cases. Last, majority courts reason that eliminating the
dangerous probability of success element would create a chilling
effect on competition. Very simply, courts adopting this
approach view the courts and society as better off with the pres-
ent state of the law.
II. THE MINORITY POSITION: INDEPENDENT PROOF OF
DANGEROUS PROBABILITY OF SUCCESS NOT NECESSARILY
REQUIRED
The minority position, as developed in the Ninth Circuit
has in various cases deemphasized or eliminated the dangerous
probability of success element. The leading Ninth Circuit case,
Lessig v. Tidewater Oil Co.,25 involved a service station owner
who sued his supplier, alleging antitrust violations including an
attempt to monopolize the market. The Lessig court expressly
rejected dangerous probability of success as an essential element
of an attempt action, and focused instead on intent. The court
held that in an attempt to monopolize case, dangerous
probability of success may be inferred from specific intent.26
The most recent Ninth Circuit cases have retreated some-
what from the broad sweep of Lessig and have generally given
the dangerous probability of success element an inferential role.
TRUST L.J., supra note 3, at 1440 (remarks of Robert Bork).
24. The monopolist is one who charges higher prices than the market would nor-
mally bear. The monopolist usually cuts production, thereby reducing supply and
increasing price. When demand is inelastic, meaning consumers will buy regardless of the
price, the monopolist need not reduce production in order to raise prices.
25. 327 F.2d 459 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 377 U.S. 993 (1964).
26. Id. at 474. The court held that "specific intent itself is the only evidence of
dangerous probability the statute requires ... ." One author, liowever, has argued that
"even in the Ninth Circuit, dangerous probability of success ... [is] essential to a claim
of attempted monopolization." Kaye, Attempt to Monopolize in the Ninth Circuit: The
Legacy of Lessig, 12 WMLLAMEIrE L.J. 331, 333 (1976).
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In A.H. Cox & Co. v. Star Machinery Co.,27 the court stated that
"[i]n most cases dangerous probability of success will be inferred
from predatory conduct and specific intent to control prices or
exclude competition. ' 28 In California Steel & Tube v. Kaiser
Steel Corp.,2 9 the court stated that when conduct and intent are
not clearly predatory or anticompetitive, the plaintiff must pre-
sent independent proof of dangerous probability of success by
showing the defendant already controls a significant market
share.3 0 The Ninth Circuit thus still requires dangerous
probability of success, either as an independent, essential ele-
ment of the attempt action, or as an inference from other neces-
sary elements.
Courts adopting the minority position raise several funda-
mental arguments disputing the necessity of the dangerous
probability of success requirement. First, the purposes underly-
ing the Sherman Act and the Act's language prohibiting
attempts to monopolize 1 support the view that the Sherman
Act prohibits anticompetitive conduct and not a condition, or
state of being, which the dangerous probability of success ele-
ment and market share analysis are directed toward proving.
Congress intended the Sherman Act to be a "comprehensive
charter of economic liberty aimed at preserving free and unfet-
tered competition as the rule of trade," 2 and to "sweep away all
appreciable obstructions so that the statutory policy of free
trade might be effectively achieved." 3 While section 1 of the
Sherman Act prohibits unreasonable restraints of trade, section
2 proscribes "all attempts to reach the end prohibited by the
first section, that is restraints of trade, by an attempt to monop-
olize . . . ,,4
The literal language of section 2 also supports the position
that the attempt to monopolize offense proscribes conduct and
not a state of being. Section 2 makes it unlawful for any person
to "attempt to monopolize ... any part of trade or com-
27. 653 F.2d 1302 (9th Cir. 1981).
28. Id. at 1308.
29. 650 F.2d 1001 (9th Cir. 1981).
30. Id. at 1004.
31. 15 U.S.C. § 2 (1976) provides "every person who shall. . . attempt to monopo-
lize. . . any part of the trade or commerce. . . shall be deemed guilty of a felony .
32. Northern Pacific Ry. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1, 4 (1958).
33. United States v. Yellow Cab Co., 332 U.S. 218, 226 (1947).
34. Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 221 U.S. 1, 61 (1911).
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merce." 8 "Attempt," as it is commonly understood, connotes
conduct and not a state of being. Justice Holmes in Swift analo-
gized an attempt to monopolize action to the criminal law of
attempt. 86 For proof of an attempt, the criminal law requires
some conduct sufficient to allow an inference of unlawful
intent." The law does not require completion of the crime; it
requires conduct. Moreover, "monopolize" is a verb, necessarily
requiring some action and not just a condition, or state of being.
In addition, the Supreme Court has stated that section 2 does
not prohibit existing monopolies. "Thin market" monopolies"
and monopolies resulting from historic accident, superior prod-
ucts, or business acumen do not violate section 2. s' The attempt
language in the Sherman Act is clearly directed at anticompeti-
tive conduct, and simply does not reach a state of being.
The legislative history of section 2, though sparse, also sup-
ports the view that section 2 in general and the attempt clause
in particular prohibit conduct and not a state of being. Legisla-
tive history reveals that the 51st Congress was concerned with
the social costs that monopolies impose 0 and proscribed the
conduct that enabled firms to attain a monopoly position. Con-
gressional sponsors of the Act defined monopolization as con-
duct directed toward the goal of monopolization.41 An attempt
to monopolize is simply conduct that falls short of achieving its
intended goal of a completed monopoly. The evidence clearly
35. 15 U.S.C. § 2 (1976). See supra note 1.
36. "The distinction between mere preparation and attempt is well known in the
criminal law. The same distinction is recognized in cases like the present." Swift & Co. v.
United States, 196 U.S. 375, 402 (1905).
37. The common law of attempt "does not insist that the criminal actor be within
range of success, but only that he have externalized his unlawful animus in a deliberate
effort to bring it to actuality." L. SULLIVAN, supra note 12, § 51, at 137-38.
38. A "thin market" monopoly occurs when the market demand is too low to sup-
port more than one producer. United States v. Aluminum Co. of America, 148 F.2d 416,
430 (2d Cir. 1945).
39. United States v. Grinnell Corp., 384 U.S. 563, 570-71 (1966). The Court in Grin-
nell stated that monopoly power, without more, is not a violation of section 2.
40. 1 E. KINTNER, THE LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE FEDERAL ANTITRUST LAWS AND
RELATED STATUTES 9-12 (1978). The author notes some of the policies underlying passage
of the Sherman Act, including society's aversion to ruthless business practices, higher
prices, discriminatory rebates, market divisions, graft and general political corruption.
Id.
41. Senator Hoar, a proponent of the Act, quoted from "Webster's Dictionary the
definition of the verb 'to monopolize': To purchase or obtain possession of the whole
.... To engross or obtain by any means the exclusive right of ... trading to any place
..... " 21 CONG. REc. 3145, 3152-53 (1890) (emphasis added).
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demonstrates that Congress intended the Sherman Act to pro-
hibit active conduct and not a passive state of being.
Attempt to monopolize is a conduct offense. Monopoliza-
tion, though, is partially a structural offense, and the difference
between the two necessitates eliminating dangerous probability
of success as an element in an attempt case.42 The Supreme
Court defined monopolization as "the possession of monopoly
power in the relevant market and the willful acquisition or
maintenance of that power,"4 and monopoly power as the
"power to control prices or exclude competition."" Courts have
clearly indicated that proof of monopolization requires that the
defendant possess a seventy percent or greater share of the mar-
ket.45 Market share analysis, the typical proof of dangerous
probability of success, is thus used to prove monopolization.
Market share, however, does not relate to conduct, and should
be irrelevant for a conduct offense such as attempt to monopo-
lize. Requiring dangerous probability of success for an attempt
to monopolize action merges that action with the monopoliza-
tion prohibition, an unreasonable result in light of the indepen-
dent nature of the two offenses.
In summary, requiring evidence relating to a state of being
such as dangerous probability of success and market share in an
attempt to monopolize action conflicts with the Sherman Act's
purpose, language and legislative history.46 Section 2, through
42. See L. SULLIVAN, supra note 12, § 52, at 139; Baker, Section 2 Enforce-
ment-The View from the Trench, 41 ANTITRUST L.J. 613, 620 (1972) (discussions of the
structural aspect of the monopolization offense). For evidence that the attempt to
monopolize and monopolization offenses are separate and distinct violations, see the
Senate debate, 21 CONG. REC. 3145, 3153 (1890), where Congress rejected an amendment
that would have eliminated the attempt offense. The rejection of that amendment
reveals that Congress intended attempt to monopolize to be a separate offense.
43. United States v. Grinnell Corp., 384 U.S. 563, 570-71 (1966).
44. United States v. E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., 351 U.S. 377, 391 (1956).
45. A 70% market share was the lowest ever found sufficient for a violation. See
United States v. Paramount Pictures, Inc., 334 U.S. 131 (1948). In United States v. Alu-
minum Co. of America, 148 F.2d 416, 424 (2d Cir. 1945), the court stated that whereas a
90% share is "enough to constitute a monopoly. . . it is doubtful whether sixty or sixty-
four percent would be enough." Even though the Court in United States v. Yellow Cab
Co., 332 U.S. 218, 225 (1947), stated that market share is not crucial in finding a monop-
olization violation, see infra text accompanying notes 51-52, the Court established a mar-
ket share floor below which a monopolization violation will not be found.
46. Some commentators argue that eliminating the dangerous probability of success
requirement would essentially make section 2 a business tort statute prohibiting unfair
competition. See, e.g., Cooper, Attempts to Monopolize: A Mildly Expansionary
Approach to the Prophylactic Riddle of Section 2, 72 MICH. L. REV. 373, 455 (1974).
These critics argue that adequate remedies for unfair competition already exist under
[Vol. 5:289
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the attempt clause, prohibits conduct intended to create a
monopoly. The dangerous probability of success requirement,
shown by market share, is evidence of a state of being, not con-
duct. The Sherman Act and the attempt clause of section 2,
therefore, cannot reasonably be interpreted to require a plaintiff
to prove a dangerous probability of success in an attempt to
monopolize action.
The minority position also casts doubt upon the majority's
three primary arguments in support of the dangerous
probability of success requirement. First, the four Supreme
Court cases the majority cites as requiring dangerous probability
of success do not withstand close scrutiny. A careful reading of
the language in Swift indicates that the Court considered dan-
gerous probability of success to be a result of intent,7 not a sep-
arate element. Later Ninth Circuit cases and commentators also
interpret Swift as simply requiring intent and not dangerous
probability of success. 48 American Tobacco involved a monopoli-
zation claim; the Court did not rule on the attempt to monopo-
lize claim. 49 Lorain Journal concerned the use of existing
monopoly power to exclude a new competitor.50 Finding a dan-
gerous probability of success merely stated the result. Walker
Process was a monopolization case; the language concerning
attempt, therefore, is dicta.5 The four Supreme Court cases that
courts adhering to the majority view cite as authority are there-
fore unpersuasive.
Other Supreme Court cases support the minority position
that dangerous probability of success is not a mandatory ele-
ment in an attempt action. For example, in United States v.
the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) Act, 15 U.S.C. § 45 (1976), and various state laws.
The FTC Act, however, does not provide private plaintiffs with a right of action
against unfair competition. Only the FTC may issue cease and desist orders and seek
civil penalties for violations of the FTC rules. 15 U.S.C. § 45(b), (e) (1976). The FTC,
however, clearly has insufficient resources to prosecute all violators and therefore, is less
effective in reaching anticompetitive conduct than is the Sherman Act, which affords a
right of private action. Moreover, if the Sherman Act proscribes anticompetitive conduct,
the federal remedy should apply regardless of the applicability of state unfair business
practice statutes.
47. See supra notes 10-12 and accompanying text. "But when that intent and the
consequent dangerous probability exist .... " 196 U.S. at 396 (emphasis added).
48. See, e.g., Lessig v. Tidewater Oil Co., 327 F.2d 459, 474 (9th Cir.), cert. denied,
377 U.S. 993 (1964); L. SULLIVAN, supra note 12, § 51, at 137.
49. See supra note 15.
50. See supra note 17.
51. See supra note 18.
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Yellow Cab Co.,52 the defendant conspired to monopolize the
sale of taxicabs in four midwestern and eastern cities. The Court
held that proof of defendant's market share was not necessary in
a conspiracy to monopolize case, relying on section 2 language
that makes it unlawful to "monopolize any part of the trade or
commerce . . ... " Although Yellow Cab involved a conspiracy
to monopolize, the Supreme Court's conclusion that market
share is not necessary in a conspiracy to monopolize action is
persuasive authority. The literal language of section 2, and Yel-
low Cab, compel the conclusion that an attempt to monopolize
"any part" of a market violates that section irrespective of mar-
ket share or the probability that the monopolist will succeed.
The majority's second argument, that eliminating dangerous
probability of success will result in more nuisance cases, disre-
gards the potential threat to competition posed by firms with
relatively small market shares. Claims involving defendants with
relatively small market shares, which courts adopting the major-
ity view dismiss for failure to prove dangerous probability of
success, do not necessarily involve de minimus amounts of inter-
state commerce." For example, a firm controlling twenty per-
cent of an economically large market may command considera-
ble resources. Certainly administrative problems could result
from nuisance cases, particularly considering the length of anti-
trust trials and the complexity of the issues involved. However,
courts can use other methods to reduce the burden of attempt to
monopolize cases that are more efficient and fairer than barring
legitimate claims by requiring a dangerous probability of suc-
cess." Requiring this additional element effectively allows
52. 332 U.S. 218 (1947).
53. Id. at 225 (emphasis added). The Court held that because section 2 prohibits
monopolization of "any part" of interstate trade or commerce, defendant's "relative posi-
tion in the field of cab production has no necessary relation to the ability of [defen-
dant's] to conspire to monopolize or restrain, in violation of the Act, an appreciable seg-
ment of interstate cab sales." Id. at 226. Despite this broad proscription, the Supreme
Court has never found a monopolization violation where the defendant's market share
was below 70%.
54. E.g., United States v. Empire Gas Corp., 537 F.2d 296 (8th Cir. 1976), cert.
denied, 429 U.S. 1122 (1977). The record indicated that Empire Gas had several hundred
plants and operations in over twenty states. 537 F.2d at 298.
55. See generally REPORT TO THE PRESIDENT AND ATTORNEY GENERAL OF THE
NATIONAL COMMISSION FOR THE REVIEW OF ANTITRUST LAWS AND PROCEDURES (1979),
reprinted in [Jan.-June] ANTITRUST & TRADE REG. REP. (BNA) No. 897 (Special Supp.,
Jan. 18, 1979) [hereinafter cited as REPORT]. The Commission suggested other methods
by which courts might speed up the litigation process: imposing mandatory time limits
for making motions, narrowing and controlling the scope of discovery and imposing sanc-
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defendants with small market shares to destroy competitors and
competition with impunity.
The majority asserts as its third argument that the danger-
ous probability of success requirement promotes competition by
shielding smaller firms from antitrust liability for attempt to
monopolize. The effect of the majority view, however, is pre-
cisely the opposite. United States v. Empire Gas Corp.5 6 dem-
onstrates that requiring proof of a dangerous probability of suc-
cess and a high market share impedes rather than promotes
competition. The defendant in Empire Gas was a large whole-
saler and retailer of liquified petroleum charged with an attempt
to monopolize the market for these fuels.5 7 Defendant had
engaged in a host of anticompetitive activities, including
requesting competitors to raise their prices to meet its own and
threatening to price competitors out of business if they refused
to do so.58 Defendant also retaliated against recalcitrant compet-
itors by drastically reducing its prices in the competitor's market
and, on several occasions, by purchasing a competitor's fuel sup-
ply and then charging him prices so high that the competitor
was unable to effectively compete. The record indicates that
defendant successfully forced at least one competitor to capitu-
late and sell at a uniform higher price. 0 The court found a spe-
cific intent to monopolize and a probable market share of
approximately fifty percent. The court did not, however, find an
attempt to monopolize because it found no dangerous
probability of success.6 1 Conduct like that involved in Empire
Gas seems to stifle rather than foster competition by reducing
the amount of competition between the firm and its uncoopera-
tive competitors and new entrants in the market.6 2 Empire Gas
demonstrates that permitting anticompetitive exclusionary con-
duct simply because the aggressor firm was not dangerously
tions for dilatory behavior.
56. 537 F.2d 296 (8th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1122 (1977).
57. Id. at 298.
58. Id. at 299-300.
59. Id.
60. Id. at 300.
61. Id. at 299, 306-07.
62. New entry into a market usually indicates that the market is healthy and com-
petitive, and for this reason is one of the best indicators of a competitive market. When a
market is fiercely competitive and profits are low, however, new entry tends to taper off
as investors will seek higher profit markets. Hence, the presence of new entrants into a
market is not a prerequisite for a competitive market. 2 P. AREEDA & D. TURNER, supra
note 12, 409, at 298-99.
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close to monopolizing the market prevents the competition the
antitrust laws seek to promote. 3
Further, eliminating the dangerous probability of success
element will not chill aggressive competitive conduct by smaller
firms, as the majority suggests, because proof of high market
share is relevant when intent and conduct are ambiguous. The
majority and minority agree that ambiguous conduct will not by
itself trigger attempt to monopolize liability." When conduct is
ambiguous the courts require greater proof of predatory intent; a
high market share can prove that intent.6 On the other hand,
when conduct and intent are clearly anticompetitive, dangerous
probability of success and market share should be irrelevant.
Courts must exercise caution, however, in defining anticompeti-
tive conduct in order to avoid chilling legitimate aggressive mar-
ket behavior, as the majority courts suggest. Clearly anticompe-
titive conduct would include acts such as the systematic threats
and cutthroat pricing Empire Gas used to deter price-cutting
and force competitors to sell at uniform higher prices. The
fraudulent patent procurement involved in Walker Process"
also has no legitimate competitive purpose. The requirement of
dangerous probability of success and high market share immu-
nizes small firms engaged in such objectionable conduct from
antitrust liability contrary to the purposes of both the Sherman
63. The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals discussed this problem in Greyhound Com-
puter v. International Business Machs., 559 F.2d 488 (9th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 434
U.S. 1040 (1978). The court stated:
If proof of an economic market, technically defined, and proof of a dangerous
probability of monopolization of such a market were made essential elements
of an attempt to monopolize, as a practical matter the attempt offense would
cease to have independent significance. A single firm that did not control
something close to 50% of the entire market would be free to indulge in any
activity, however unreasonable, predatory, destructive of competition and
without legitimate business justification. Any concern not dangerously close to
monopoly power could deliberately destroy its competitors with impunity
... A construction of the Sherman Act that would immunize such practices
would be contrary to the purposes of the Act . ...
559 F.2d at 504 (citations omitted).
64. For the majority cases, see supra note 5. For the minority view, see California
Steel & Tube v. Kaiser Steel Corp., 650 F.2d 1001 (9th Cir. 1981); Janich Bros. v. Ameri-
can Distilling Co., 570 F.2d 848 (9th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 829 (1978).
65. A firm with a large market share engaged in ambiguously anticompetitive con-
duct is more likely to be attempting to monopolize than a small firm engaging in the
same conduct. Majority and minority courts agree that market share analysis is a way to
gauge the intent behind ambiguous conduct.
66. 382 U.S. 172 (1965). In Walker Process the Court held that fraudulent patent
procurement may give rise to antitrust liability. Id. at 176-77.
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Act and the attempt to monopolize clause.
The final concern of the majority courts, that eliminating
the dangerous probability of success element will reduce price
competition and cause umbrella pricing, 7 addresses the most
fundamental theoretical debate in antitrust law. Were the anti-
trust laws designed to promote efficiency, allowing the elimina-
tion of the inefficient competitor, or were they designed to guar-
antee a market with a large number of competitors? 8 Adherents
to the majority view argue that a dominant producer will raise
prices to avoid even the appearance of predatory pricing 9 and
potential antitrust liability, allowing other less efficient firms to
67. See supra notes 23-24 and accompanying text.
68. Critics of the antitrust laws argue that the law is "being directed towards a 'pro-
tectionist' policy 'of preserving competitors from their more energetic and efficient rivals'
at the expense of businessmen's freedoia to serve both their own and the public's best
interest .... " Blake & Jones, In Defense of Antitrust, 65 COLUM. L. REv. 377, 381
(1965). On the other hand, proponents of the antitrust laws argue that "antitrust oper-
ates to forestall concentration of economic power which, if allowed to develop
unhindered, would call for. intrusive government supervision of the economy." Id. at
383.
69. Predatory pricing, simply stated, is pricing below marginal cost, or the cost of
producing the next unit. Commentators view predatory pricing as a monopolist's tool for
forcing a competitor out of business. By pricing at a loss, the aggressor hopes that its
competitor, who has fewer resources, will be unable to meet its low prices for any reason-
able length of time and thus will be destroyed in the competitive struggle. The aggressor
may then recoup its losses by charging monopoly prices after the competitor is gone.
Considerable difference of opinion exists over the scope of predatory pricing and its
usefulness as a tool for antitrust analysis. 3 P. AREEDA & D. TURNER, supra note 12, 1
711, at 150-54. Predatory pricing is irrational absent significant barriers to entry. Once
the old competitor is eliminated, a new one could take its place, forcing the aggressor to
begin the process again. No aggressor can operate at a loss forever. The ability to elimi-
nate a competitor, however, acts as a significant barrier to entry in itself. When a domi-
nant producer in a market has destroyed a competitor, new entrants will not rush to
enter the market to become the next victim. Once a competitor has been effectively
destroyed, subsequent threats may be sufficient to deter potential entrants.
Predatory pricing, however, should not be per se illegal but rather should merely
create a rebuttable presumption of illegality. Legitimate reasons exist for selling below
marginal cost, such as meeting a competitor's price or selling at bargain prices. An inflex-
ible rule would simply not effectively serve the purposes behind the antitrust laws.
Some analysts, including the National Commission for the Review of Antitrust Laws
and Procedures, note a tendency in the lower federal courts to find that pricing above
marginal cost is per se legal. See 48 ANTITRUST L.J., supra note 3, at 1433, 1436 (remarks
of John Shenefield). This result is inappropriate when an established firm prices at or
near marginal cost, intending to run a new competitor out of the market and then raise
prices. If the dominant producer has not allowed a new entrant sufficient time to become
efficient and to compete effectively, society loses the benefits of the competition that
would have resulted. This Comment, therefore, adopts the position that above marginal
cost pricing should not be per se legal and below marginal cost pricing should not be per
se illegal. Courts should examine a firm's pricing policy in light of all of the relevant
evidence.
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operate under this price umbrella to the consumer's detriment.
Implicit in the majority's argument is the belief that antitrust
laws seek to protect the consumer from high prices and ineffi-
cient production, not from a market with too few sellers.
Economic efficiency may be an important goal70 of antitrust
law, but it is not the only one. Congress in enacting the Sherman
Act 71 and the courts in interpreting it also evidenced concern for
dispersing economic and political power.72 This social goal of
antitrust law heavily favors increasing the number of competi-
tors in the market." The divestiture remedy74 in monopolization
cases clearly demonstrates society's interest in preventing econ-
omic concentration. Furthermore, although the monopolist may
be the most efficient producer in terms of economy of scale, anti-
trust law condemns monopolies. Moreover, it is axiomatic that a
70. Critics of the antitrust laws find the social and political concerns to be "ques-
tionable as a description of congressional intent, dubious as social policy, and impossible
as antitrust doctrine." Bork & Bowman, The Crisis in Antitrust, 65 COLUM. L. REV. 363,
369 (1965). The true purpose underlying the antitrust laws, they contend, is "allocating
resources to . . . [maximize] consumer satisfactions [and] encouraging efficiency and
progressiveness .... " Blake & Jones, supra note 68, at 381.
71. Commentators have noted the public's and Congress' concern with dispersing
economic power.
By the late 1880's, the accumulation and use of vast economic power by these
[trusts and monopolies] had caused great public hostility, evidenced by a pop-
ular, generalized hatred of trusts and commercial monopolies .... The Sher-
man Act debates contain numerous references to this public resentment, which
was one of the prime causal factors behind the legislation ....
1 E. KINTNER, supra note 40, at 11. For example, Senator Vest noted "there will be no
controversy . . . as to the enormity of the abuses that have grown up under the system
of trusts and combinations which now prevail in every portion of the Union." 21 CONG.
REc. 2462 (1890).
72. See United States v. Vons Grocery Co., 384 U.S. 270 (1966), where the Court
stated "from this country's beginning there has been an abiding and widespread fear of
the evils which flow from monopoly-that is, the concentration of economic power in the
hands of a few." Id. at 274.
73. In United States v. Aluminum Co. of America, 148 F.2d 416 (2d Cir. 1945), the
court stated: "Throughout the history of these statutes it has been constantly assumed
that one of their purposes was to perpetuate and preserve, for its own sake and in spite
of the possible cost, an organization of industry in small units which can effectively com-
pete with each other." Id. at 429. In Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 370 U.S. 294, 344
(1962), the Court stated:
We cannot fail to recognize Congress' desire to promote competition through
the protection of viable, small locally owned businesses. Congress appreciated
that occasional higher costs and prices might result from the maintenance of
fragmented industries and markets. It resolved these competing considerations
in favor of decentralization. We must give effect to that decision.
74. 15 U.S.C. §§ 25, 26 (1976). The divestiture remedy, whereby courts may order
corporations to "split up" or divest themselves of part of the corporation, arises out of
the courts' broad equitable powers.
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competitive market cannot exist with only one competitor. Even
if economic efficiency were the sole aim of antitrust law, courts
would defeat this purpose by allowing large, efficient producers
to exclude by anticompetitive means the very competitors that
force them to strive for efficient production and low prices.
The majority's argument that the dangerous probability of
success requirement keeps prices at a competitive level because
producers will not be threatened with antitrust liability for
aggressive pricing is flawed for another reason. The argument
fails to recognize that other elements must be proven before
antitrust liability will be imposed. Mere aggressive pricing does
not constitute an antitrust violation without an intent to control
prices or exclude competition.7 5 Furthermore, under either the
minority or majority view, where intent and conduct are ambig-
uous the court will examine market share.76 Rather than chilling
legitimate, competitive market behavior, eliminating the danger-
ous probability of success requirement will deny the defense of
insufficient market share to firms engaging in clearly anticompe-
titive conduct.
The minority has decided correctly not to require indepen-
dent proof of dangerous probability of success and market share
in all attempt cases. The courts should, however, eliminate this
element altogether instead of inferring dangerous probability of
success from intent or conduct." In an attempt to monopolize
75. An attempt to monopolize violation requires specific intent. See, e.g., Times-
Picayune Publishing Co. v. United States, 345 U.S. 594, 626 (1953); United States v.
Griffith, 334 U.S. 100, 105 (1948); Swift & Co. v. United States, 196 U.S. 375, 396 (1905).
The aggressor must possess the specific intent to control prices or exclude competition,
in other words, monopoly power. United States v. E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., 351
U.S. 377, 391 (1956). See Schine Chain Theatres, Inc. v. United States, 334 U.S. 110,
120-21 (1948).
76. For the majority position, see Lektro-Vend Corp. v. Vendo Co., 660 F.2d 255
(7th Cir. 1981). For the minority position, see A.H. Cox Co. v. Star Mach. Co., 653 F.2d
1302 (9th Cir. 1981).
77. The National Commission for the Review of Antitrust Laws and Procedures in
its 1979 report to the President essentially committed the same error as has the Ninth
Circuit. REPORT, supra note 55. Rather than eliminating the dangerous probability of
success requirement altogether, thereby eliminating confusion in the attempt to monopo-
lize analysis, the Commission recommended that proof of dangerous probability of suc-
cess be dependent upon whether the defendant has significantly threatened competition.
Id. at 40. Clearly anticompetitive conduct, for example, fraudulent patent procurement
in Walker Process, or the systematic requests to raise prices, threats to predatorily cut
prices and subsequent price cuts in Empire Gas, would demonstrate that threat to com-
petition. See supra notes 18-19 & 56-63 and accompanying text. REPORT, supra note 55,
at 43. If the conduct and intent are not clearly anticompetitive, then an examination of
market share may help guarantee that the defendant really is close to attaining monop-
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case where conduct and intent are plainly anticompetitive, the
defendant's size, as shown by dangerous probability of success
and market share, is simply irrelevant. Attaching importance to
the size of the defendant and his probability of succeeding in
such a situation adds nothing but confusion to the attempt to
monopolize analysis. Eliminating this unnecessary element
would streamline the analysis, eliminate the confusion, and bet-
ter effect the purposes underlying the Sherman Act. Market
share analysis could still play a role by illuminating the intent
behind ambiguous conduct, but would no longer provide a
defense for smaller firms whose intent and conduct are plainly
anticompetitive.
III. CONCLUSION
The purpose, language and legislative history of the attempt
to monopolize clause support eliminating the dangerous
probability of success element from the attempt to monopolize
analysis. Rather than promoting competition as the majority
view asserts, requiring dangerous probability of success actually
chills competition by smaller firms, contrary to the policies of
the Sherman Act. Entirely eliminating the dangerous probability
of success requirement would simplify the law of attempt to
monopolize, eliminate the confusion and better promote the
statutory policy of free competition.
John C. Bjorkman
oly power. Id. This "balancing" approach endorsed by the Commission is the same as the
approach adopted in this Comment except for the Commission's needless retention of
the dangerous probability of success language.
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